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ABSTRACT 
Using primary field data from recently developed urban areas of Nepal, we identify households 
who migrated from rural to urban areas and analyze the impact of international remittances on 
their investment in education. The results show that rural-urban migrant households who receive 
international remittances have lower income and consumption but higher human-capital 
investment, measured by the level and budget share of expenditure on children’s education and the 
time their children spend studying at home, in comparison to local households and other types of 
migrant households. The findings suggest that an important motivation for rural-urban migration 
is the search for higher-quality education, because the experience of international migration helps 
households to know the higher returns to education abroad and international remittances help to 
finance the costs of both internal migration and education. We also observe that the quality of 
education is an increasingly important concern in contemporary Nepalese society, possibly due to 
the anticipated higher returns to education in the global labor market. (163 words) 
Keywords: Rural-urban migration, International migration, Remittances, Hurdle Model, Human 
capital, Nepal  
JEL Codes: O15, C24, J24  
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I. Introduction 
In recent decades, the world has witnessed megatrends of migration and 
remittances. Approximately 700 million people are internal migrants, mostly living in 
urban areas of developing countries (DCs); in 2013, 232 million people lived outside their 
countries, of which 70 percent were migrants from DCs.1 In 2014, the officially estimated 
global flow of remittances was $580 billion, of which almost three-fourths ($443 billion) 
was toward DCs.2 In fact, remittances comprised the second-largest (after foreign direct 
investment) external resource flow for DCs. Accordingly, there is a growing interest in the 
impacts of migration and remittances on an economy among academicians, policy makers, 
public officials, development practitioners, and others (see de Hass, 2010; Skeldon, 2008; 
Stark and Wang, 2002). Migration dynamics and, in particular, links between domestic and 
international migration practices, generally shapes the direction and magnitude of 
development outcomes, and thus may be especially important in developing economies. 
Unfortunately, there are limited theoretical and empirical works about the link between 
internal and international migration. As an exception, Skeldon (2006) has analyzed the 
evolution and the link between internal and international migration in Southeast Asia and 
concluded that each can affect the other, suggesting the need to consider them as an 
integrated system. 
Employment and earning potential (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Henderson, Shalizi, & 
Venables, 2001), investment, for example, in physical and financial assets (Osili, 2004) 
and the enjoyment of urban amenities (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013) are considered the main 
motives for migration of people from rural areas to urban areas. It already has been 
established that international migration, through remittances, insures the households left 
behind against risk and uncertainty (Stark, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985) and relaxes credit 
constraints (Calero, Bedi, & Sparrow, 2009; Halliday, 2006). However, very few studies 
have explored the role of migration in relaxing information constraints, for instance, 
migration as a medium for diffusion of learning and knowledge (Williams & Baláž, 2008) 
and its role in information acquisition and transmission (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014) 
such as enhancing investment in human capital. Accordingly, international migration may 
induce information-constrained parents (for instance, uneducated mothers)—who may 
otherwise underinvest in their children’s schooling (as theorized by Becker, 1993)—to 
increase enroll their children in school or transfer their children from public to private 
schools (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). However, when the performance of public 
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schools is poor and there are few private schools in rural areas, the increasing demand for 
higher-quality education may discourage rural households who receive remittances and 
aspire for quality education from remaining in their hometowns. They may migrate to 
nearby town centers, regional cities, or capital cities, depending upon their preferences, 
proximity, and capabilities. To our best knowledge, whether international migration 
encourages rural families to migrate to urban areas for their children’s education, with 
international remittances financing the migration, has yet to be explored. 
In order to fill this gap, this study attempts to explore the human-capital investment 
behavior of rural-urban migrant households whose working members live abroad and 
identify whether the major motivation for their migration to urban areas was their 
children’s education. We measure human-capital investment in terms of the level and 
budget share of expenditure on children’s education and the time the children spend 
studying at home. We hypothesize that migrant households have a higher level of 
investment in human capital in comparison to urban natives, despite similar or lower level 
of current welfare measured by income and consumption, and therefore their major 
motivation for migration is their children’s schooling; otherwise, we would not be sure 
whether their prime concern was children’s schooling. In this study, we use household 
survey data from newly developed urban areas of Nepal, which was collected by the 
authors through a nationally representative Nepal Remittance, Investments, and 
Urbanization Survey (NERIUS) in late 2011. This case is particularly interesting, because 
during the past two decades Nepal has experienced rapid progress in school enrollment, 
phenomenal growth in work-related foreign migration and remittance inflows, and 
astonishing rural-urban family migration and urbanization, despite a decade-long civil 
conflict, and political and socioeconomic transition. 
We find that rural-urban migrant families, particularly those that migrated very 
recently and received international remittances, invest more on human capital than do local 
families with a similar level of education, despite their lower level of income and 
consumption. These migrant households spend three times more on education and allocate 
a larger share of their budgets to education than do local households. Moreover, children 
of these migrant households spend more time studying at home than do children of local 
households. These findings suggest that the human-capital investment motive is stronger 
than is the urban-life motive among recent migrant households, especially those that have 
received international remittances. We also observe that the quality of children’s 
education—a factor found to be crucial to productivity and economic growth (see Barro, 
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1992; Hanushek & Woessamann, 2008)—is an increasingly major concern in 
contemporary Nepalese society. This concern may relate to the increasing expected return 
on investment in education, for instance, due to the “brain drain” (Beine, Docquier, & 
Rapoport, 2001), the potential to migrate abroad, where the return on education is much 
higher than in Nepal. This finding is in line with that of Shrestha (2015), who showed that 
changing the education criteria for recruitment of Gurkha in the British Army improved 
the schooling of both migrants and non-migrants in Nepal. The level of human-capital 
investment is found to be very high among rural-urban migrant households that received 
remittances from abroad, with international migration possibly contributing to the 
“knowledge acquisition about value of and return to children’s education” among 
information-constrained parents (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). In addition, 
international migrant parents’ experiences in the global labor market could increase their 
anticipated returns to education. Meanwhile, international remittances have made the 
costly internal migration of rural households feasible by financing the costs of migration, 
settlement in urban areas, and education expenses. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of recent changes, migration practices, and the educational system in Nepal. 
Section III describes the survey methodology, data, and descriptive analysis. Section IV 
discusses the empirical models. Section V presents the results, discussion, and robustness 
checks. Section VI concludes the paper by summarizing some policy implications of the 
findings. 
II. Migration Practices and the Educational System in Nepal 
Contemporary Nepalese society is characterized by unique socioeconomic and 
political transition. First, Nepal experienced political openness through the restoration of 
multiparty democracy in 1990 after the demise of the three-decade party-less panchayat 
regime. Afterward, the Nepalese government adopted a liberal economic policy that not 
only encouraged participation of the private sector in the education, health, communication, 
transportation and manufacturing sectors but also facilitated open trade and out-migration. 
The April 2006 mass protest (Jana Andolan II) ended the two-and-a-half-century 
monarchy and concluded the transformation of the decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996–
2006) into a peace process.3 The protest also paved the way for restructuring a unitary 
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country into a federal and inclusive democratic country by encouraging broader 
participation from the more than 125 castes and ethnic groups and 123 linguistic groups.4 
Second, Nepal experienced phenomenal growth in migration, driven by foreign 
employment opportunities and the resulting inflow of remittances back to the households 
that had been left behind in Nepal. Annual emigration from Nepal, excluding those who 
migrated to India, increased from a few thousand people in 1993/94 to more than 512,000 
people in 2014/15. It is estimated that at least 3 million Nepalese live abroad (excluding 
India), at least half of that concentrated in Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates.5 It is estimated that one-third of all Nepalese households have at least one family 
member living abroad for employment or education (CBS, 2011). Accordingly, the 
recorded annual remittance inflows to Nepal increased from $50 million in 1993 to $5.87 
billion in 2014, with the ratio of remittance inflows to GDP increasing from 2 percent to 
29.9 percent. In 2014, Nepal had become the third-largest remittances recipient country 
relative to the size of economy.6 
Third, Nepal has achieved remarkable progress with regard to access to education, 
despite slow economic growth and political turbulence. Net primary school enrollment 
increased dramatically, from 64 percent in 1990 to 96.2 percent in 2014/15.7 In addition, 
parental concern for English education has increased, possibly due to English knowledge 
increasing the probability of employment in both the domestic and international markets 
and providing the potential for study abroad. Accordingly, the private sector has become 
more involved in education, with its share on enrollment increasing sharply, from less than 
5 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2010/11 (CBS, 2011). 
There is a sharp difference in the quality and cost of education between public and 
private schools. In general, the academic performance of public school students is poorer 
than that of private school students. For instance, in the national School Leaving 
Certificate (SLC) examination in 2015, only 47.79 percent of students passed, but the pass 
rates for public school students (33.74%) and private school students (89.8%) differed 
dramatically. Among the passed students, 86.44 percent private school students scored  
first division (score above 60%) or distinction (score above 80%) while only 32.1 percent 
public school students scored at first division or distinction.8 In terms of finance, private 
schools in Nepal, in contrast to religious schools or other types of private schools in other 
countries, are financed almost entire by the parents. For instance, in our survey data, the 
average household expenditure on education per child, including all related expenses, such 
as tuition, books, stationary, uniforms, lunch, and so forth, for children attending private 
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school ($222.50) is almost four times than that for children attending public school 
($57.80). These statistics reveal the large parental investment in private schooling for 
higher-quality education in Nepal. 
Fourth, Nepal has experienced astonishing growth of urbanization in recent 
decades. The number of municipalities increased from 33 in 1986, to 58 in 1997, and 217 
in 2015. Accordingly, the urban share of Nepal’s population increased from 9.1 percent in 
1991, to 14.2 percent in 2001, and 41.8 percent in 2015.9 The major factor behind Nepal’s 
rapid urbanization, similar to other DCs (Lall, Selod, & Shalizi, 2006), is rural-urban 
migration, consistent with the theory of rural-urban migration (Lucas, 1997). According to 
Population Census (2011), during 2001–2011, in contrast with the national population 
growth rate of 1.4 percent, 23 of the 75 districts experienced negative population growth; 
this contrast provides evidence of the concentration of Nepal’s population in particular 
areas. 
In addition, many rural households, particularly those that receive a large amount 
of international remittances, have been moving to urban areas—local and newly developed 
urban centers, district headquarters, regional cities, the capital city and its suburbs—
depending on affordability, preferences, and access to better education, health services, 
and other facilities. It is generally believed that many of these migrant households are 
abandoning agriculture and engaging in non-farm activities or doing no income-generating 
activities other than taking care of children and relying solely on remittances for financial 
support. 
Now, the following questions arise: Has the practice of investing in quality and 
English medium education increased over time in Nepalese society? Is children’s 
education a primary motivation for the migration of rural households that have working 
members living abroad? Have international remittances to households in Nepal financed 
the costly rural-urban migration of those households? In our view, international migration 
has encouraged rural households in areas that lack quality education to migrate to urban 
areas for better-quality English medium private education when international remittances 
finance the migration process, including the costs of settlement in the urban area and the 
costs of the children’s education. To answer these questions, we conducted a survey of 288 
households from recently flourished urban areas of Nepal in November and December 
2011. 
III. Survey Data and Key Features of the Study Area 
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The household survey data 
To capture the general pattern of recent rural-urban migration in Nepal, we define 
our study area as the 41 new urban areas that were declared municipalities by the 
government of Nepal (GoN) in mid-July 2011.10 Although these municipalities were not 
formally operationalized by the government during the survey period, they serve as proxies 
for the large number of new urban areas that have flourished in recent years. These new 
urban areas are heterogeneously distributed across the country. In particular, 4 are located 
in the Mountain region, 22 are located in the Hill region, and the remaining 15 are located 
in the Tarai region.11 Administratively, 3 are in Kathmandu, the capital valley, and 15 are 
district headquarters. 
We conducted the survey in 2011, using a three-stage stratified random sampling 
approach. In the first stage, we randomly chose 12 urban areas, representing all three 
ecological belts and five development regions, based on their population shares as of 2001 
(Figure 1).12 Figure 1 is a map of Nepal in which the sample urban areas are highlighted. 
//Figure 1 about here// 
In the second stage, based on the discussions with local authorities, facilitators and 
informants, the wards of each sample municipality were categorized into three broad 
groups. The first category consisted of wards that were centers of the municipality, were 
characterized by mainly urban activities, and had possibly experienced in-migration. The 
second category consisted of intermediate wards that were characterized by both urban and 
rural activities and might had experienced in-migration during the previous ten years. The 
third category consisted of periphery wards that were characterized by mainly agricultural 
activities and had rarely experienced in-migration. As a primary sampling unit (PSU), one 
ward was randomly chosen from the first and second category of each municipality; thus, 
two PSUs were chosen from each sample municipality, for a total of 24 PSUs in the survey. 
In the third stage, household rosters for each PSU were prepared. The rosters 
included basic information about the household head, household size, whether the 
household had arrived in the study area after 2001, and the number of household members 
who lived abroad. Based on this information, the listed households were categorized into 
two groups: local households (urban native households and those households that had 
arrived in the municipality before or during 2001) and migrant households (households 
that had arrived in the municipality after 2001). Each group of households was further 
divided based on whether at least one family member was living abroad. From these four 
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strata, 12 households in each PSU were randomly selected such that, to the extent possible, 
at least 50 percent of them were migrant households and at least 50 percent of them had 
members living abroad. Accordingly, the survey was composed of 288 sample households, 
12 from each of 24 PSUs. Table 1 (Panel A) presents the regional and ethnic distribution 
of households by the above categories. 
//Table 1 about here// 
We collected household data through individual interviews by using a pilot-tested 
household questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of questions about household 
demographics, income, expenditures, education, land, housing, durable goods and other 
real assets holdings, and entrepreneurship. More specifically, it captured detailed 
information about in-migration and out-migration (from the household’s hometown to 
other parts of Nepal and abroad). Data were collected at both the individual and household 
level, depending on the nature of the information required. We complemented this 
questionnaire with a community questionnaire, which was administered at the PSU level to 
capture information about the prices of major commodities, access to major facilities and 
services, such as schools, transportation, communication, health, banking, and financial 
services, and the overall pattern of in-migration and out-migration. 
Descriptive analyses 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the size, composition, and education of the 
sample households. Among migrant households, the average year of arrival (YSM) from 
their hometown village is 4.95 years. On average, remittance-recipient migrant households 
arrived later than did non-recipient migrant households. Local households were larger in 
size than migrant households. The proportion of young children (aged below 10 years) was 
higher among migrant households than local households, while local households had a 
higher proportion of older children (aged 11–24 years). The proportion of adult men (aged 
25–64 years) was higher among migrant households, while local households had a higher 
proportion of adult women (aged 25–64 years) and elderly (aged above 64 years). 
// Table 2 about here // 
Table 2 (Panel B) shows that migrant households, on average, were slightly less 
educated than were local households. Among remittance non-recipient households, the 
education level, on average, was lower for migrant households than for local households; 
in contrast among remittance-recipient households, the education level of migrant 
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households was higher than that of local households. The average number of children 
attending school was similar for both local and migrant households. However, migrant 
households were more likely to send their children to private schools than were local 
households, because remittance-recipient migrant households mostly sent their children to 
private schools. These results, consistent with those of Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez (2014), 
suggest that migrant households, particularly those that receive remittances, were more 
concerned about private schooling for their children than were local households. 
Table 3 shows the differences in household income and consumption between 
migrant and local households. Migrant households had lower level of welfare measured by 
average per capita household income (Panel A) as well as average per capita household 
consumption (Panel C) in comparison to local households. These results also generally 
hold true for the subsamples of households categorized based on receiving remittances: 
remittance-recipient households generally had higher income than did non-recipient 
households, regardless of whether they were local households or migrant households. 
However, these remittance-recipient households had similar consumption in comparison to 
non-recipient households. This implies that remittance-recipient households saved or 
invested more in physical assets than did non-recipient households. 
// Table 3 about here // 
Among sample households, there was heterogeneity in the distribution of income 
by source (Table 3, Panel B). The share of foreign remittances was approximately 30 
percent for migrant households but only 14 percent for local households. Wages, enterprise 
profits, and assets rent constituted the major sources of income for local households, while 
enterprise profits and wages were important sources of income among migrant households, 
particularly non-recipient ones. In the subsample of remittance-recipient households, 
remittance inflows constituted approximately 40 percent of income for local households 
and 63 percent of income for migrant households. These figures prove that remittances 
were a major source of income for migrant households. 
Table 3 (Panel E) shows the distribution of consumption by categories. Food 
expenditure share was larger for migrant households than for local households, in the full 
sample and the subsamples categorized based on receipt of international remittances. Local 
households had a higher average propensity to spend on non-food items than did migrant 
households. Most importantly, migrant households allocated a far larger share of their 
budgets to education than did local households. The results also hold true in the subsample 
categorized based on international remittances, although the gap is far larger in the 
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subsample of remittance-recipient households. The level of expenditure on education also 
was higher for migrant households than for local households, despite migrant households’ 
lower level of household income and total consumption. This was due to the higher 
spending on education of migrant households that receive international remittances. These 
results are consistent with the pattern of school attendance (Table 2) and the findings of 
Adams and Cuecuecha (2010), who showed that, in Guatemala, remittance-recipient 
households had extremely high marginal spending on education, compared to non-
recipient households. These results further suggest that migrant households, particularly 
those that received remittances, largely invest in human capital. 
IV. Empirical Specifications 
To investigate the human capital investment behavior of rural-urban migrant 
households in Nepal, we propose empirical models for comparing migrant households and 
local households in terms of (i) expenditure on education and its share of budget 
(household level), (ii) expenditure on education (child level), and (iii) time that children 
spend studying at home (child level). We employ a traditional Engel curve method using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate expenditure on education and its budget share, at 
the household level, as follows: HEDUi = β0 + β1Mi  + β2EXPi +  β3Hi + β4Ci + β5Di +  εhi    (1) 
where the dependent variable, HEDUi, is the natural logarithm of household expenditure 
on education (EDUEXPi) 13  for school-age children (aged 5–24 years) or its share 
(EDUSHAREi) of the household’s total consumption. εhi is an error term with zero mean. 
The model is estimated for the subsample of households that have at least one school-age 
child, for the full sample and separately for households that did or did not receive 
international remittances during the survey year. The estimates are reported in Tables 4 
and 5 (Specifications (1) through (3)).  
//Table 4 and 5 about here// 
Among the explanatory variables, Mi, the variable of interest in this study, is a 
dummy variable for migrant households, equal to one if a household arrived in the PSU 
after 2001 and zero otherwise. EXPi is the natural logarithm of household consumption, 
used as a proxy for household permanent income, as does the literature on the estimation 
of Engel curves.14 
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Hi is a vector of household characteristics, including human capital measured by 
the years of schooling of the most educated member of the household who is at least 25 
years old15 and household demographics measured by household size and composition. Ci, 
composed of a set of caste–ethnicity dummy variables (Brahmin–Hills, Brahmin–Tarai, 
Chhetri, Newar, Ethnic–Hills, Dalit, and Ethnic–Tarai and minorities), is used to control 
for differences in human and physical asset endowments and preferences with regard to 
schooling among castes and ethnic groups. Finally, Di, a set of dummies for development 
regions (Eastern, Central, Western, and Mid-western, and Far-western), is used to control 
for spatial differences in access to and preference regarding education. 
The estimation of education expenditure could be corner solution outcome. Some 
households did not send their children to school at all, took their children out of school 
when they had completed a certain level, or did not have any expenditure on education for 
children currently attending school. In those cases, the OLS estimates may be inconsistent 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 524). The OLS estimates may also be biased downward when a 
large proportion of sample households have a corner solution at zero (Deaton, 1997). 
However, we can consistently estimate the Engel curve using a Tobit model based on the 
assumption that the same mechanism drives both the “participation decision” (i.e. having 
zero expenditure on education) and the “amount decision” (i.e., the level of expenditure on 
education):  HEDUi∗ = β0 + βHXi +  εhi                                (2) HEDUi = HEDUi∗ if HEDUi∗  > 0 and             HEDUi = 0  otherwise                                        (3) 
where HEDU* is a latent variable of the observed counterpart variable HEDU, and εhi is 
the error term. HXi is a set of explanatory variables (Mi, EXPi, Hi, Ci, and Di), which are 
the same as in Model (1). Following Wooldridge’s approach (2002, p. 522-523), the 
conditional marginal effect of an explanatory variable, for instance HXj, is as follows: 
∂E(HEDU| HX,HEDU>0)
∂HXj
= βj{(1 − λ(c)[ c + λ(c)]}       (4) 
where λ(c)=𝜙𝜙 (c)/ Φ (c) is the inverse Mills ratio, c= HXβ/σh , 𝜙𝜙 (.) and Φ (.) are the 
probability and cumulative density functions, respectively, and σh is the standard deviation 
of the error term εhi. The conditional marginal effects of the Tobit estimates for 
specifications (4) through (6) are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
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The Tobit model is too restrictive, because it assumes that the same mechanism to 
determine both the “participation decision” and the “amount decision.” In other words, it 
assumes that the effect of an explanatory variable both on the probability of positive 
expenditure and the amount of expenditure has the same sign. However, zero outcomes 
may occur due to, for example, a lack of preference with regard to education, while 
variation in the amount of positive expenditure may occur due to budget constraints. 
Therefore, we also use a hurdle model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Kingdon, 2005; 
Wooldridge, 2002), which allows participation in education expenditure and the amount of 
education expenditure to be determined by different processes or sets of variables. If the 
participation condition in equation (5) is satisfied, then the amount of education 
expenditure is determined by equation (6): HAVEHEDUi∗ = β0 + βHZi + uhi                                             (5) HEDUi = 1[HAVEHEDUi∗ > 0](β0 + ΓHSi +  vhi )            (6) 
where equation (5) is a probit model with latent dependent variable HAVEHEDU. 
Equation (6) is estimated via linear regression truncated at zero (i.e., it is estimated using 
households that had expenditure on education). The dependent variable HEDU in equation 
(6) is the natural logarithm of education expenditure. The explanatory variables HZ and 
HS are specified in the same way as HX in Model (3), but their coefficients in equations 
(5) and (6) are allowed to enter with different coefficients in equations (5) or (6). β and Γ 
are the vectors of parameters to be estimated. The error terms uhi and vhi are independent of 
each other as well as independent of HZ and HS. The hurdle estimates are reported in 
Table 4 and 5 (Specification 7-12). 
At child level, we estimate the following human capital investment model: CEDUj = γ0 + γ1Mj  + γ2EXPj +  γ3CPj + γ4CHj + γ5Cj +  γ6Dj +  εcj   (7) 
where CEDUj, the dependent variable, is (i) CEDUEXPj, the natural logarithm of 
expenditure on the education of child j16 or (ii) CTIMEj, the number of hours that child j 
spent studying home during the past seven days. We estimate this model similar to the 
household-level models, using OLS, Tobit, and two-part (hurdle) models for the full 
sample of children (aged 5–24 years) and separately for subsamples of those children 
categorized based on whether their household received international remittances during the 
survey year. εcj is the error term. The estimation results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
//Table 6 and 7 about here// 
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The explanatory variables (Mj, EXPj, Cj, and Dj) are the same as in Model (1). CPj 
is a vector of child characteristics, such as age cohort (the base cohort, primary, consists of 
children aged 5–10 years, secondary consists of children aged 11–16 years, and tertiary 
consists of children aged 17–24 years), sex (a dummy variable equal to one for male 
children and zero otherwise), and birth order.17 CPj also includes dummy variables for the 
maximum educational level of the child’s parents (the base category, no formal schooling, 
followed by not completed primary, completed primary, completed lower secondary, and 
completed secondary or higher). CHj is the natural logarithm of household size. 
V. Estimation Results 
Determinants of financial investment in children’s education 
In this subsection, we present the results of the estimation of education expenditure 
and its share of budget. Table 4 summarizes the OLS, Tobit, and hurdle estimates for the 
natural logarithm of household expenditure on education. The coefficients of the OLS 
estimates (specifications (1) through (3)) and the conditional marginal effects of the Tobit 
estimates (specifications (4) through (6)) indicate that migrant households spend more on 
education than do local households. However, the estimates are significant for full sample 
and the subsample of remittance-recipient households but not for the subsample of non-
recipient households. For instance, based on OLS estimates for the full sample, migrant 
households spend 125 percent more than do local households, and for the subsample of 
remittance-recipient households, migrant households spend 209 percent more than do local 
households. The Tobit estimates are greater than the OLS estimates suggesting that the 
OLS estimates are biases downward. 
The estimates for the hurdle models (Table 4, specifications (7) through (12)) also 
support the OLS and Tobit estimates. The probability of having positive expenditure on 
education is higher for migrant households in the full sample and the subsample of 
remittance-recipient households but not in the subsample of non-recipient households. 
However, the coefficient for the full sample is not statistically significant, because the 
coefficient for the subsample of remittance-recipient households is positive and 
statistically significant but the coefficient for the subsample of non-recipient households is 
negative and statistically significant. The education expenditure conditional on the 
household with positive education expenditure is higher for migrant households in all 
specifications and statistically significant for all except the subsample of remittance non-
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recipient households. These results suggest that the higher level of investment in education 
by migrant households than by local households is due to both a greater likelihood of 
spending on education and a higher level of expenditure on the education of children from 
remittance-recipient migrant households. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimates for the education expenditure share of budget at 
the household level. The OLS, Tobit, and hurdle model estimation results are qualitatively 
similar to the estimates on expenditure amount (Table 4), in terms of both sign and 
statistical significance. This implies that particularly remittance-recipient migrant 
households spend a larger amount on education and also allocate larger budget share on 
education than do local households and non-recipient migrant households. These findings 
are consistent with the findings of Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) for Guatemala and Yang 
(2008) for the Philippines.  
Regarding other covariates, income elasticity (consumption as a proxy) is 
statistically significant for all estimates for education expenditure (Table 4, specifications 
(1) through (12)). However, the estimates are positive but not statistically significant for 
education’s share of budget (Table 5), which implies that, although they spend more on 
education, rich households may not allocate a larger share of their budgets on education 
than do poor households. In other words, poor households strive to provide for their 
children’s education, despite their lower level of asset endowments, earnings, and current 
consumption. The education of the household member has a positive (always) and 
statistically significant (in most cases) effect on education expenditure and its share of 
budget, with larger effects in the subsample of remittance-recipient households. Household 
size has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on education expenditure and its 
share of budget. Education expenditure and its share of budget increase with the proportion 
of school-age children, as expected. 
We do not find strong evidence that upper caste (Brahmin–Hill and Chhetri) 
households spend more on education than do households of other castes. However, Dalit 
families spend significantly more on education than did Ethnic–Tarai families and families 
of other castes or ethnic groups, all else equal. However, when we do not control for 
education level and income, Dalit households spend far less on education than do 
households of upper castes and Ethnic–Hill households.18 This result reveals a higher level 
of motivation among Dalit parents with regard to their children’s schooling. Recent 
provisions for affirmative action such as reservation or quota for women and deprived 
groups (Dalit, Madheshi, and Janajati people, people with disabilities, and people from 
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remote areas) in the public sector may have increased those groups’ expected returns to 
education. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimates of education expenditure at the child level. The 
OLS and Tobit estimates for the full sample (specifications (1) and (4)) and subsample of 
remittance-recipient households (specifications (3) and (6)) show that children from 
migrant households have a statistically significant higher level of education expenditure 
than do children from local households. In the full sample, children from migrant 
households spend 106 percent more on education than do children from non-migrant 
households (specification (1)). In the subsample of children from remittance-recipient 
households, children from migrant households spend 236 percent more on education than 
do children from non-migrant households (specification (3)). The coefficients of the 
double-hurdle models suggest that the differences in education expenditure arise from the 
higher likelihood of education expenditure among migrant households, in particular 
remittance-recipient ones, than among local households (specifications (7) and (11)). This 
implies that children from migrant households, in particular from those that receive 
international remittances, are more likely to be enrolled in school than are children from 
local households (similar to the results shown in Table 2, Panel B). 
Table 6 also shows that children of the primary age cohort (aged 5–10 years) have 
a higher level of expenditure on education than do children of the secondary (aged 11–16 
years) and tertiary (aged 17–24 years) age cohorts. This is due to higher school attendance 
and a greater likelihood of enrollment at private schools (specifications (7) and (8)). This 
also implies increasing recognition of the value of and the returns to education among 
parents over time. There are huge gender differences in education expenditure. On average, 
education expenditure for boys is higher than for girls: 107 percent higher in the full 
sample and 127 percent higher in the subsample of children of remittance-recipient 
households. Children of more educated parents have much higher education expenditure. 
The effect of parental education is stronger and greater for children of remittance-recipient 
households than for children of non-recipient households, but the income effect is smaller 
for children of remittance-recipient households than for children of non-recipient 
households. 
In summary, our results—regardless of the model specification—show that 
differences in education expenditure of rural-urban migrant households and local 
households in Nepal are driven by remittance-recipient migrant households’ large 
investments in education. However, this education expenditure is caused not only by 
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migration to urban areas but also by a greater effect of parental education (Table 6) 
regardless of whether the households are remittance recipients (Table 5). The findings are 
further supported by the higher enrollment in private schools of children of remittance-
recipient migrant households. Therefore, among remittance-recipient households, the 
major motivation for migration is improving the quality of their children’s education, 
which is found possible by the international remittances. 
Determinants of time allocation for children’s education 
In this subsection, we present the results of the estimation of time that children 
spend studying at home and mothers’ supervision of children’s study at home. Table 7 
summarizes the OLS, Tobit, and hurdle model estimates of weekly hours spent studying at 
home by children aged 5 to 24 years. The coefficients of the OLS estimates (specifications 
(1) through (3)) and the conditional marginal effects of the Tobit estimates (specifications 
(4) through (6)) indicate that children from migrant households spend more time studying 
at home than do children from local households. However, those estimates are statistically 
significant only for the full sample and the subsample of remittance-recipient households. 
According to the OLS estimates, in the full sample, children from migrant households 
spend 2.37 hours more time studying at home than do children from local households, 
while in the subsample of remittance-recipient households, children from migrant 
households spend 3.48 more hours studying at home than do children from local 
households. 
The hurdle model estimates (Table 7, specifications (7) through (12)) also support 
the OLS and Tobit estimates. The probability of spending time studying at home is 
significantly higher for children from migrant households than for children from local 
households, in both the full sample and the subsample of remittance-recipient households, 
but insignificant in the subsample of non-recipient households. The number of hours that 
children spend studying at home, conditional on time being allocated to it, is greater for 
migrant households in all specifications but statistically significant only for the full sample. 
These results contradict Antman’s (2011) findings for Mexico, where the labor market was 
imperfect and remittances could not compensate for lost labor. 
Table 7 also shows that children from affluent households spend more time 
studying at home than do children from poor households, in most of the specifications. 
Children from large households generally spend less time studying at home than do 
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children from small households, possibly because parents of small families place greater 
importance on education. Secondary school-age cohort children spend more time studying 
at home than do primary school-age cohort children. However, tertiary school-age cohort 
children spend less time studying at home than do primary school-age cohort children, 
possibly due to having left school or engaging in work. Boys spend more time studying at 
home than do girls, which reveals discrimination in intra-household labor allocation. More 
educated parents allow their children to spend more time studying, in full sample and 
subsample of remittance-recipient children. 
Robustness of the findings 
There are three major potential concerns about the validity of our results. First, it 
may be argued that a rural-urban migrant household may not be completely integrated in 
an urban area even a decade after arrival. Second, it is unclear whether migration of rural 
families to urban areas for the purpose of schooling is an increasing trend. Third, during 
the decade-long Maoist conflict (1996–2006), many rural individuals and families had to 
forcibly migrate to other rural and urban areas of Nepal or abroad (Bohra-Mishra & 
Massey, 2011; Martinez, 2002). Regarding this third concern, although our data suggest 
that only negligible fractions of migrant individuals aged 5 years and above (2.44%) and 
migrant household heads (3.57%) explicitly reported conflict as their primary reason for 
migrating from rural areas to urban areas, we cannot completely disregard the presence of 
conflict as one of the factors affecting the migration decision. Indeed, it would be 
misleading to assume that migrant households escaping from conflict migrated in search of 
better schooling for their children. 
To address these three concerns—the definition of a migrant household, the 
dynamics of parental investment in quality education, and forced migration during the 
decade-long Maoist insurgency—we estimate less restrictive specifications by excluding 
the migration dummy variable (M) and simultaneously including the three dummy 
variables as: prior-conflict migrant households (those that arrived in the urban area 
between 1991 and 1995), in-conflict migrant households (those that arrived in the urban 
area between 1996 and 2006), and post-conflict migrant households (those that arrived in 
the urban area after 2006). The dummy variable for local households (households that 
were urban natives or arrived in the urban area before 1991) serves as the base category. 
The resulting estimates are reported in Table 8. 
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//Table 8 about here// 
The household-level results for both education expenditure and its share of budget 
are congruent with the main findings of this study. Pre-conflict migrant households spend 
less on education than do local households, but in-conflict and post-conflict migrant 
households spend more (although statistically insignificant) on education than do local 
households (Panel A, specification (1)). Moreover, only post-conflict migrant households 
spend a significantly higher share of budget on education than do local households (Panel 
B, specification (1)). At the child level, in the full sample, children from migrant 
households, on average, have higher education expenditure, but the coefficients are 
statistically significant only for children from in-conflict and post-conflict migrant 
households (Panel C, specification (1)). The estimates for the subsamples show that, 
among remittance-recipient households, children from in-conflict and post-conflict migrant 
households have significantly higher education expenditure and budget share than do 
children from local households (Panels A and B, specifications (3), (6), (11), and (12)). For 
the subsample of children from non-recipient households, the coefficients of in-conflict 
and post-conflict migrant household dummy variables are generally positive but 
statistically insignificant. 
We further check whether expenditure on private schooling reflects the intent to 
invest in higher-quality education. The questionnaire used in this study asked household 
heads for their opinions about private school and the reasons for sending their children to 
private school. Of the 164 sample households that were sending at least one child to 
private school, quality was the primary reason for doing so. The main reason given by 61 
percent of the households that chose private schools was one of the following, all of which 
pertain to quality: teachers make more effort in teaching (32%), classes are regular in 
school (19%), and children put forth more effort (10%) in private school. The offering of 
English medium classes (23%) was the next most common reason given. However, as 
expected, the demonstration effect (11%)—following the advice of relatives, neighbors 
and friends—was not so important in the decision to send children to private school. These 
views are well-supported by the differences between the SLC examination results of public 
schools and private schools (see section II of this paper). In addition, the popularity of 
private schooling was greater for the primary school-age cohort than for the secondary 
school-age cohort, which implies a growing trend. Thus, despite uncertainty in the 
domestic environment, parents are increasingly investing in education in an effort to obtain 
higher quality for their children, possibly anticipating a high return on education in the 
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global labor market. These findings are consistent with brain drain hypothesis mentioned 
earlier in this paper, which is amplified among migrant households by information 
acquisition and remittance-financed rural-urban migration. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the effect of international migration and remittances on 
internal rural-urban migration of families in Nepal that choose to migrate in search of 
higher-quality education for their children. The analysis using data from recently 
developed urban areas in Nepal, has shown how international migration and the resulting 
remittances have become instrumental in financing the costly rural-urban family migration 
process in Nepal. The human capital investment behavior of migrant households has been 
analyzed by estimating the money and time spent on education. 
According to the descriptive statistics, migrant households spend more on 
education—in terms of both amount and share of budget—than do local households, 
despite having lower levels of income and consumption. The econometric analysis also 
showed that these migrant households, on average, spend three times more on education 
and allocate a larger share of their budgets to education than do their counterpart local 
households. In addition, children from these migrant households spend more time studying 
at home than do children from local households. These findings suggest that the human 
capital investment motive is stronger than the urban life motive particularly among recent 
migrant households. Meanwhile, international remittances have contributed to making the 
costly rural-urban household migration possible, by providing funds to cover the costs of 
migration, settlement in urban areas, and education expenses.  
We also found that recently arrived migrant households invest more in their 
children’s education than do old migrant households or local households. These results 
support that the migration of rural households to urban areas in Nepal in an effort to 
provide better-quality education for their children is a growing practice, particularly after 
increased opportunities in global labor market. The results also suggest that the quality of 
children’s education is an increasingly major concern in contemporary transitional 
Nepalese society. 
Supply-side interventions aimed at improving access to quality education in rural 
areas (e.g., incentive packages, such as school vouchers for private schools, vocational 
schools, and colleges, and upgrades of public schools) may result in more equitable or 
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even optimal outcomes. Increased rural infrastructure, particularly roads, communication, 
and electricity, may attract the educated talent required for providing quality schooling in 
rural areas. Policies to provide information about the costs of and returns to education in 
local and global labor markets may be crucial for determining the optimal level of 
investment in children’s schooling.  
                                                          
1 Domestic migration figures are from Lall, Selod, and Shalizi (2006), while international figures are based on the 
International Migration Report 2013 published by the United Nations. 
2 Figures are based on the Migration and Development Brief 25 (2015), published by the World Bank. 
3 See Hachhethu, Kumar, and Subedi (2008) for a discussion of recent political developments in Nepal. 
4 Ethno-linguistic figures are based on the Population Census (2011), published by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), Nepal. 
5  Data are from the Department of Foreign Employment, Government of Nepal (2015). Under a reciprocal 
agreement between Nepal and India, Nepalese can enter into India through an open border and work there 
without a visa. Therefore, estimating the annual flow of Nepalese people to India is difficult. It is estimated that 
more than 2 million Nepalese migrants live in India. 
6 Figures are based on the Migration and Development Brief 24 (2015), published by the World Bank. 
7 Figures are from Nepal in Figures, 2003, published by the CBS and Nepal Education in Figures 2015 published 
by Ministry of Education, Government of Nepal.  
8 Calculations are based on Nepal Education in Figures 2015 published by the Ministry of Education, Government 
of Nepal. 
9 Figures are based on Nepal’s population censuses for 1991, 2001, and 2011. 
10 The GoN’s declaration was not operationalized immediately. Rather, in July 2014 the GoN declared 72 new 
municipalities including 41 urban areas surveyed in this study. Additional 61 municipalities were declared in 
December 2014 and 28 municipalities in 2015. 
11 Geographically, Nepal is divided into three regions: the Mountain region in the north (altitude 4,877–8,848 
meters), the Hill region in the middle (altitude 610–4,876 meters), and the Tarai region (altitude 70–4,875 
meters) in the south. 
12 During the survey, CBS had released the preliminary results of the population census, 2011 only up to the 
district level; therefore, we could not obtain data at the local administrative (village development committee or 
municipality) level. Instead, we used data from the population census 2001 to prepare the primary sampling 
frame. 
13 We use the natural logarithm of one plus EDUEXP as a dependent variable to avoid missing value while taking 
log. 
14 Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), we calculate household income and consumption (see the notes to Table 3). 
We allowed for the nonlinearity of consumption by including its squared and cubed terms, but those did not 
generate statistically significant coefficients. Therefore, we proceeded with a linear Engel curve. 
15 We assume that school-age children (aged 5–24 years) are less likely to engage in activities from which income 
is earned. Accordingly, their education level should not directly affect the household’s current income but may 
affect the household’s future income. Therefore, in calculating the years of schooling of the most educated adult 
member of the household, we exclude school-age children. Results using the years of schooling of the most 
educated member of the household aged 17 or above (not reported here) are robust to our main results shown in 
Table 4, but the R2 is drastically smaller. 
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16 We use the natural logarithm of one plus CEDU as a dependent variable to avoid the problem of missing value 
while taking log. 
17 Following the approach of Booth and Kee (2005), birth order is defined as: 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ 𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 = 2×𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂(1+𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). 
18 There are drastic differences in education among castes and ethnic groups. The years of schooling of the most 
educated adult household members aged 25 and above are lowest for Dalit (4.98); the highest are for Brahmin–
Tarai (11.08), followed by Brahmin–Hills (9.35), Newar (9.05), Chhetri (8.64), Ethnic–Hills (8.27), and Ethnic–
Tarai, minorities, and others (8.19). 
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Figure 1. The Study Area of NERIUS (2011). 
Spatial data source: The Survey Department of the Government of Nepal. 
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Table 1 
Sampling Distribution of Households 
  
Local Households   Migrant households 
Having members 
abroad 
Not having 
member abroad   
Having 
members abroad 
Not having 
member abroad 
      
A. Full study area      
No of households in sampling frame 1,728 4,520  640 1,808 
No of sample households 64 113  53 58 
Percent of sample households in 
sampling frame 19.87 51.98  7.36 20.79 
      
B. Ecological Belt  
(Distribution by household types)      
Mountains 13.36 81.23  1.08 4.33 
Hills 21.05 47.65  7.25 24.05 
Tarai 19.60 52.25  8.31 19.85 
 
     
C. Development Region  
(Distribution by household types)      
Eastern  18.95 50.83  6.77 23.46 
Central 16.86 55.97  7.12 20.05 
Western  25.28 39.06  11.66 24.00 
Mid-Western  13.34 56.61  5.99 24.06 
Far-Western  26.45 67.15  0.62 5.79 
Note. If a household arrived in the PSU (primary sampling unit) after 2001, it is defined as Migrant household (M). Otherwise it is defined 
as local household. The sampling frame is the household roster prepared at PSU level and includes 8,696 households.  
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Table 2 
Household Composition and Education by Migration and International Remittances 
Variable 
All households   International remittances non-recipient households   
International remittances 
recipient households 
Local Migrant   Local Migrant   Local Migrant 
         
Years Since Migration (YSM) n.a. 4.95  n.a. 5.28  n.a. 4.58 
         
A. Household size and composition         
Household size 4.95 4.08  5.23 3.97  4.45 4.21 
Household size§ 6.15 5.27  6.11 4.55  6.23 6.06 
Proportion of children         
aged 0-4 0.08 0.09  0.08 0.09  0.08 0.08 
aged 5-10 0.11 0.17  0.11 0.16  0.10 0.17 
aged 11-16 0.13 0.11  0.15 0.10  0.11 0.12 
aged 17-24 0.19 0.18  0.19 0.18  0.19 0.17 
Proportion of adult  men aged 25-64 0.22 0.25  0.19 0.25  0.27 0.24 
Proportion of adult women aged 25-64 0.22 0.19  0.23 0.19  0.21 0.19 
Proportion of elderly (64+) 0.05 0.02  0.06 0.03  0.05 0.02 
         
B. Education         
Years of schooling of the most educated 
adult member (aged 25 and above) 8.84 8.73  8.87 8.16  8.80 9.36 
No of children (aged 5-24) in         
school 1.70 1.70  1.88 1.52  1.39 1.91 
public/community school 0.88 0.65  1.04 0.71  0.59 0.58 
private school 0.82 1.05  0.84 0.81  0.80 1.32 
         
No of households (N) 177 111   113 58   64 53 
Note. If a household arrived in the PSU (primary sampling unit) after 2001, it is called Migrant household (M). Otherwise it is called local 
household. § Including absent members also. 
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Table 3 
Household Income and Consumption by Migration and Remittances 
Variable 
All households   International remittance non-recipient households   
International remittance 
recipient households 
Local Migrant   Local Migrant   Local Migrant 
         
A: Income (NPR thousand)         
Household income 380.46 301.69  340.18 251.42  451.57 356.69 
Per capita income 92.65 82.26  74.45 76.95  124.78 88.08 
         
B: Distribution of household income by 
sources (%)         
Wage 23.01 18.25  26.63 28.22  16.63 7.35 
Farm 15.69 11.08  17.25 13.27  12.93 8.68 
Enterprises 19.72 20.56  25.37 32.92  9.74 7.05 
Assets use/rent 20.80 13.30  23.29 14.96  16.41 11.48 
Domestic remittance 2.27 4.71  3.03 8.53  0.92 0.53 
Foreign remittance 13.99 30.13  0.00 0.00  38.69 63.11 
Pension and others 4.53 1.96  4.43 2.11  4.69 1.80 
         
C: Consumption (NPR Thousand)         
Household consumption 260.22 212.61  266.36 203.42  249.38 222.67 
Per capita consumption 62.16 55.69  60.41 55.46  65.23 55.95 
         
D: Distribution of household 
consumption by categories (NPR 
Thousand)         
Food 99.65 89.67  101.62 84.70  96.18 95.11 
Non-food 0.13 0.09  0.13 0.09  0.12 0.09 
Durable services 10.76 8.30  12.00 9.75  8.58 6.72 
Education 21.02 23.64  21.77 19.32  19.71 28.37 
      
E: Distribution of household 
consumption by categories (%)         
Share of food 41.33 44.78  40.56 43.65  42.70 46.02 
Share of non-food 47.78 41.08  47.90 42.88  47.57 39.12 
Share of durable services 3.30 3.54  3.72 4.34  2.56 2.67 
Share of education 7.59 10.59  7.83 9.13  7.17 12.19 
         
No of households (N) 177 111   113 58   64 53 
Note. If a household arrived in the PSU (primary sampling unit) after 2001, it is called Migrant household (M). Otherwise it is called local 
household.  
Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), we include earnings from wage/salary job, farm, enterprise and renting out assets, user value owner 
occupied housing and durable assets, remittance received from members staying out of their home town, and pension and other income 
(excluding the sale of assets such as land, house, etc.) in household income. We include expenses on purchased food, consumption of own-
produced food, spending on non-food, consumption of services from durables holding prior to the survey year and expenses on schooling of 
children aged 5 to 24 in household expenditure. We exclude expenses on health, festivals, marriage and dowry as well as purchase of land, 
housing, durable assets, jewelry, etc.  
During survey year, the exchange rate was about Nepalese Rupees (NPR) 80 for a US dollar. 
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Table 4 
OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Household Expenditure on Education (Household Level) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. 
Mar. Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 0.873** 0.431 1.326**  0.958** 0.471 1.465**  0.013 0.284*** -0.050* 0.225 0.275** 0.211* 
 (0.340) (0.482) (0.634)  (0.396) (0.486) (0.631)  (0.028) (0.096) (0.027) (0.155) (0.119) (0.120) 
Log of household expenditure 2.047*** 1.900*** 2.261***  2.173*** 1.956*** 2.453***  0.119*** 0.998*** 0.180*** 0.965*** 0.254** 1.004*** 
 (0.465) (0.721) (0.702)  (0.463) (0.594) (0.726)  (0.038) (0.122) (0.057) (0.196) (0.100) (0.164) 
Years of schooling of the most 
educated adult aged 25 0.117*** 0.042 0.198**  0.130*** 0.045 0.225**  0.004 0.034*** -0.000 0.026* 0.016** 0.056*** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.085)  (0.046) (0.051) (0.085)  (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) 
Log of household size 0.493 0.206 0.169  0.572 0.268 0.230  -0.041 0.031 -0.104* -0.065 -0.093 -0.014 
 (0.483) (0.744) (0.790)  (0.501) (0.619) (0.798)  (0.042) (0.133) (0.054) (0.209) (0.077) (0.168) 
Proportion of children aged 0-4 -4.483 -5.775 -0.606  -5.235** -6.550** -1.172  -0.205 -0.163 0.235 -0.676  1.130 
 (2.838) (3.955) (4.133)  (2.648) (3.066) (4.513)  (0.164) (0.736) (0.191) (1.102)  (0.989) 
Proportion of children aged 5-10 8.188*** 4.768 13.162***  8.859*** 4.957 14.570***  1.423*** 1.598** 1.748*** 0.986  3.015*** 
 (2.665) (3.973) (3.253)  (2.596) (3.105) (3.974)  (0.304) (0.694) (0.502) (1.048)  (0.891) 
Proportion of children aged 11-
16 3.867 2.350 6.801**  4.100* 2.375 7.374**  0.279* 1.238* 0.453** 0.683 -0.369** 2.561*** 
 (2.616) (3.945) (3.104)  (2.408) (2.916) (3.702)  (0.165) (0.650) (0.185) (1.002) (0.162) (0.826) 
Proportion of children aged 17-
24 3.070 1.630 3.685  3.276 1.570 4.153  0.174 1.187* 0.549** 0.654 -0.925*** 2.231*** 
 (2.405) (3.689) (3.059)  (2.452) (2.966) (3.672)  (0.178) (0.649) (0.215) (1.003) (0.209) (0.799) 
Proportion of working age men 
(25-64)  0.470 2.199 1.300  0.611 2.508 1.530  0.042 -0.437 0.467** -1.075 -1.086*** 0.238 
 (2.874) (3.956) (4.235)  (2.692) (3.295) (4.043)  (0.190) (0.724) (0.210) (1.102) (0.320) (0.917) 
Proportion of working age 
women (25-64) 3.826 5.457 -0.287  4.225 5.845* -0.306  0.162 0.401 1.169*** -0.139 -0.256 1.686* 
 (2.440) (3.392) (3.862)  (2.849) (3.359) (4.569)  (0.188) (0.736) (0.399) (1.106) (0.345) (0.975) 
Caste/Ethnicity 
              
Brahmin-Hills  0.447 -0.412 0.639  0.528 -0.426 0.755  0.022 -0.066 -0.001 0.003  -0.022 
 (0.567) (0.630) (0.839)  (0.636) (0.765) (0.998)  (0.033) (0.116) (0.032) (0.175)  (0.157) 
Brahmin-Tarai  0.133 -0.303 1.861  0.147 -0.353 2.081        
 (0.622) (0.722) (1.351)  (0.923) (0.978) (1.932)        
Chhetri 0.272 -0.033 -0.312  0.314 -0.025 -0.315  0.017 0.117 -0.015 0.202 -0.042 0.155 
 (0.489) (0.473) (0.909)  (0.596) (0.745) (0.901)  (0.031) (0.105) (0.032) (0.162) (0.051) (0.140) 
Newar  0.018 0.362 -0.433  0.062 0.381 -0.370        
 (1.007) (0.509) (2.461)  (0.977) (1.095) (1.750)        
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Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. 
Mar. Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Ethnic Groups -Hills -0.979 -2.007** -1.053  -1.082 -2.259** -1.103      -0.276**  
 (0.629) (0.927) (0.978)  (0.691) (0.921) (0.956)      (0.113)  
Dalit 1.525** 0.995 0.772  1.757** 1.101 1.076        
 (0.726) (0.720) (1.276)  (0.767) (0.917) (1.263)        
Development Regions 
              
Eastern  0.502 0.846 -2.257*  0.501 0.878 -2.491*  0.074 0.226*  0.428**  -0.187 
 (0.575) (0.599) (1.295)  (0.656) (0.702) (1.386)  (0.046) (0.130)  (0.184)  (0.198) 
Central  0.176 -0.191 -1.076  0.152 -0.241 -1.210  0.016 0.281** -0.019 0.434**  -0.005 
 (0.623) (0.772) (0.993)  (0.615) (0.663) (1.250)  (0.034) (0.121) (0.030) (0.180)  (0.155) 
Western  -0.661 0.049 -2.818***  -0.785 0.006 -3.120**  -0.074** 0.150 -0.131*** 0.286 -0.179*** -0.247 
 (0.587) (0.720) (1.054)  (0.601) (0.675) (1.201)  (0.037) (0.129) (0.046) (0.195) (0.062) (0.171) 
Mid-western  -0.425 0.289 -2.699**  -0.488 0.289 -2.979**      -0.159***  
 (0.692) (0.660) (1.321)  (0.601) (0.674) (1.186)      (0.043)  
Constant -21.328*** -17.567* -23.104***  -23.476*** -18.549** -26.218***   -3.606**  -2.622  -4.503** 
 (5.940) (9.326) (7.724)  (5.812) (7.555) (8.760)   (1.547)  (2.492)  (1.996) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
Left censored observations 
   
 22 10 12  
      R2/Pseudo-R2 0.42 0.42 0.59  0.11 0.12 0.17  0.56 0.44 0.65 0.35 0.63 0.66 
Log likelihood         -551.2 -308.5 -220.8  -32.79  -12.62  -13.56  
Note. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of one plus household expenditure on education to avoid missing values. The sample includes only the households which have children aged 5 to 24. Ethnic-Tarai and 
minorities is base category for caste/ethnicity and Far-western is that for development regions.  
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
*, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table 5 
 OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Budget Share (%) of Expenditure on Education (Household Level) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance Non-recipient Remittance Recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. 
Mar. Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 2.270** 1.383 2.533  2.159*** 1.322 2.661**  0.013 2.538*** -0.050* 1.678 0.275** 2.086 
 (0.991) (1.448) (1.645)  (0.805) (1.104) (1.245)  (0.028) (0.897) (0.027) (1.344) (0.119) (1.313) 
Log of household expenditure 0.373 0.344 0.748  0.682 0.488 0.987  0.119*** -0.505 0.180*** -0.709 0.254** -0.919 
 (1.293) (2.028) (1.947)  (0.942) (1.342) (1.439)  (0.038) (1.147) (0.057) (1.700) (0.100) (1.796) 
Years of schooling of the most 
educated adult aged 25 0.329*** 0.188 0.481**  0.303*** 0.154 0.533***  0.004 0.313*** -0.000 0.230* 0.016** 0.585*** 
 (0.110) (0.151) (0.221)  (0.093) (0.116) (0.172)  (0.003) (0.098) (0.003) (0.118) (0.007) (0.201) 
Log of household size 0.832 -0.530 -0.356  0.919 -0.169 -0.065  -0.041 0.215 -0.104* -0.942 -0.093 0.142 
 (1.211) (1.632) (2.228)  (1.017) (1.400) (1.574)  (0.042) (1.249) (0.054) (1.809) (0.077) (1.847) 
Proportion of children aged 0-4 -4.574 -8.171 9.806  -5.789 -8.946 6.741  -0.205 -0.578 0.235 -2.277  9.440 
 (5.724) (8.335) (7.463)  (5.430) (7.002) (9.055)  (0.164) (6.904) (0.191) (9.538)  (10.845) 
Proportion of children aged 5-10 22.773*** 15.378* 38.193***  20.510*** 12.857* 37.947***  1.423*** 18.226*** 1.748*** 13.040  32.193*** 
 (6.057) (8.619) (8.000)  (5.294) (7.029) (7.927)  (0.304) (6.514) (0.502) (9.070)  (9.768) 
Proportion of children aged 11-
16 15.864*** 10.785 28.205***  13.565*** 8.638 26.986***  0.279* 14.707** 0.453** 10.467 -0.369** 27.312*** 
 (5.471) (8.002) (7.332)  (4.911) (6.607) (7.383)  (0.165) (6.101) (0.185) (8.676) (0.162) (9.057) 
Proportion of children aged 17-
24 14.045** 10.160 18.740***  12.014** 7.866 18.194**  0.174 13.529** 0.549** 10.346 -0.925*** 21.941** 
 (5.552) (8.346) (6.469)  (4.987) (6.713) (7.293)  (0.178) (6.091) (0.215) (8.686) (0.209) (8.762) 
Proportion of working age men 
(25-64)  -2.609 -4.263 2.514  -1.944 -2.449 2.306  0.042 -4.528 0.467** -9.105 -1.086*** 0.965 
 (6.294) (8.605) (8.874)  (5.482) (7.444) (8.063)  (0.190) (6.796) (0.210) (9.542) (0.320) (10.059) 
Proportion of working age 
women (25-64) 8.885 6.861 13.712*  8.402 7.032 12.045  0.162 6.167 1.169*** 0.974 -0.256 19.130* 
 (5.648) (8.319) (7.939)  (5.767) (7.563) (9.026)  (0.188) (6.911) (0.399) (9.577) (0.345) (10.689) 
Caste/Ethnicity 
              
Brahmin-Hills  -0.360 -0.499 -0.910  0.042 -0.419 -0.242  0.022 -0.813 -0.001 0.002  -0.979 
 (1.341) (2.054) (1.861)  (1.290) (1.719) (1.970)  (0.033) (1.087) (0.032) (1.515)  (1.723) 
Brahmin-Tarai  0.664 -0.179 6.630  0.680 -0.299 7.575*        
 (2.039) (2.686) (4.300)  (1.866) (2.195) (3.821)        
Chhetri 1.533 1.784 0.255  1.459 1.449 0.553  0.017 1.344 -0.015 2.014 -0.042 1.755 
 (1.426) (2.216) (2.000)  (1.209) (1.672) (1.794)  (0.031) (0.981) (0.032) (1.400) (0.051) (1.534) 
Newar  -0.830 0.325 -4.048  -0.471 0.336 -2.913        
 (1.579) (2.145) (2.870)  (1.988) (2.456) (3.557)        
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Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance Non-recipient Remittance Recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. 
Mar. Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Ethnic -Hills 0.251 -0.478 -0.901  -0.105 -1.312 -0.773      -0.276**  
 (1.694) (2.765) (2.043)  (1.410) (2.096) (1.905)      (0.113)  
Dalit 0.991 0.819 -2.842  1.640 1.059 -1.249        
 (1.798) (2.591) (2.997)  (1.563) (2.059) (2.538)        
Development Regions 
              
Eastern  3.019** 4.238** -4.821  2.499* 3.697** -4.696*  0.074 1.666  3.963**  -2.999 
 (1.433) (1.705) (2.947)  (1.327) (1.578) (2.743)  (0.046) (1.223)  (1.589)  (2.168) 
Central  3.799*** 3.817** -0.843  3.125** 2.961** -1.117  0.016 3.140*** -0.019 4.889***  -0.008 
 (1.458) (1.876) (2.405)  (1.245) (1.493) (2.457)  (0.034) (1.134) (0.030) (1.559)  (1.699) 
Western  1.623 2.909 -4.897*  0.970 2.275 -4.900**  -0.074** 1.388 -0.131*** 3.234* -0.179*** -3.158* 
 (1.465) (1.953) (2.534)  (1.218) (1.520) (2.368)  (0.037) (1.210) (0.046) (1.687) (0.062) (1.870) 
Mid-western  1.661 0.571 -1.391  1.119 0.393 -2.106      -0.159***  
 (1.445) (1.699) (2.455)  (1.222) (1.523) (2.343)      (0.043)  
Constant -11.412 -4.456 -16.427  -15.939 -7.348 -21.416   3.990  11.398  0.769 
 (15.606) (25.583) (19.834)  (11.853) (17.093) (17.363)   (14.524)  (21.572)  (21.886) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
Left censored observations 
   
 22 10 12        
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.22 0.52  0.06 0.04 0.12  0.56 0.23 0.65 0.24 0.63 0.37 
Log likelihood 
   
 -750.0 -445.7 -288.4   -32.79   -12.62   -13.56   
Note. The sample includes only the households which have children aged between 5 and 24. Ethnic-Tarai and minorities is base category for caste/ethnicity and Far-western is that for development regions.  
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
*, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table 6 
OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Expenditure on Education (Children aged 5-24) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 0.772** 0.343 1.355***  0.837** 0.400 1.503***  0.079** 0.122 0.049 -0.040 0.137*** 0.126 
 (0.301) (0.430) (0.482)  (0.327) (0.454) (0.522)  (0.031) (0.079) (0.041) (0.112) (0.044) (0.109) 
Log of household 
expenditure 2.747*** 3.060*** 2.258***  2.913*** 3.233*** 2.463***  0.231*** 0.692*** 0.255*** 0.717*** 0.170*** 0.744*** 
 (0.354) (0.508) (0.540)  (0.378) (0.535) (0.610)  (0.032) (0.095) (0.041) (0.138) (0.045) (0.128) 
Log of household size -1.814*** -2.526*** -1.405**  -1.904*** -2.639*** -1.458**  -0.162*** -0.403*** -0.232*** -0.557*** -0.092* -0.609*** 
 (0.373) (0.536) (0.618)  (0.399) (0.569) (0.676)  (0.035) (0.097) (0.049) (0.142) (0.056) (0.142) 
Child characteristics               
Secondary school age 
cohort -0.450** -0.143 -0.796*  -0.463 -0.149 -0.825  -0.088** -0.040 -0.023 0.021 -0.175** 0.017 
 (0.224) (0.288) (0.415)  (0.330) (0.434) (0.519)  (0.041) (0.075) (0.051) (0.101) (0.070) (0.103) 
Tertiary school age 
cohort -3.390*** -2.759*** -4.073***  -3.490*** -2.904*** -4.169***  -0.352*** 0.390*** -0.309*** 0.595*** -0.389*** 0.009 
 (0.358) (0.477) (0.570)  (0.355) (0.479) (0.571)  (0.034) (0.090) (0.039) (0.123) (0.059) (0.126) 
Male 0.756*** 0.671** 0.886**  0.818*** 0.703** 1.005**  0.052** 0.144** 0.052* 0.224*** 0.072** 0.026 
 (0.251) (0.323) (0.405)  (0.268) (0.343) (0.437)  (0.024) (0.065) (0.030) (0.084) (0.035) (0.092) 
Birth order -0.207 -0.453 0.566  -0.205 -0.482 0.665  -0.014 -0.269*** -0.036 -0.273** 0.060 -0.129 
 (0.328) (0.433) (0.524)  (0.338) (0.431) (0.566)  (0.033) (0.082) (0.040) (0.108) (0.051) (0.118) 
Maximum education level of 
parents               
Not completed primary 0.100 -0.107 0.829  0.197 -0.090 1.065  -0.045 0.272* -0.071 0.312* 0.014 0.292 
 (0.589) (0.773) (0.957)  (0.543) (0.708) (0.925)  (0.041) (0.142) (0.055) (0.188) (0.062) (0.210) 
Completed primary 1.468*** 1.330** 1.538*  1.700*** 1.492** 1.889***  0.077** 0.408*** 0.086 0.271* 0.067 0.674*** 
 (0.512) (0.669) (0.804)  (0.477) (0.639) (0.725)  (0.038) (0.121) (0.053) (0.162) (0.053) (0.163) 
Completed lower 
secondary 1.343*** 0.919 1.777***  1.510*** 0.971 2.119***  0.078** 0.468*** 0.056 0.456*** 0.119** 0.317** 
 (0.459) (0.655) (0.645)  (0.470) (0.654) (0.716)  (0.037) (0.118) (0.052) (0.166) (0.048) (0.155) 
Completed secondary 
and above 1.474*** 1.224** 2.092***  1.598*** 1.289** 2.388***  0.085** 0.513*** 0.089** 0.457*** 0.118** 0.588*** 
 (0.447) (0.594) (0.726)  (0.418) (0.533) (0.745)  (0.038) (0.106) (0.045) (0.138) (0.053) (0.160) 
Caste/Ethnicity               
Brahmin-Hills  0.058 -0.391 0.363  0.045 -0.472 0.377  -0.002 0.181 -0.000 0.078 -0.017 0.385** 
 (0.502) (0.665) (0.818)  (0.543) (0.742) (0.877)  (0.053) (0.131) (0.064) (0.186) (0.070) (0.180) 
Brahmin-Tarai  0.394 0.200 0.946  0.398 0.198 0.901  0.076 0.091  -0.005  0.487 
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Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
 (0.555) (0.688) (0.933)  (0.803) (0.966) (1.612)  (0.087) (0.183)  (0.226)  (0.311) 
Chhetri -0.301 -0.547 -0.634  -0.371 -0.625 -0.771  -0.068 0.350*** -0.084 0.277* -0.077 0.301* 
 (0.436) (0.565) (0.700)  (0.485) (0.686) (0.726)  (0.049) (0.117) (0.059) (0.166) (0.054) (0.154) 
Newar  -0.204 -0.370 -0.375  -0.234 -0.455 -0.372  -0.017 0.478** -0.022 0.615** 0.008 -0.185 
 (0.857) (1.137) (1.333)  (0.863) (1.158) (1.371)  (0.076) (0.216) (0.113) (0.285) (0.092) (0.313) 
Ethnic -Hills -0.429 -0.886 -0.842  -0.445 -0.948 -0.889  -0.043 0.055 -0.030 0.039 -0.100 -0.117 
 (0.516) (0.908) (0.745)  (0.573) (0.940) (0.788)  (0.061) (0.138) (0.080) (0.236) (0.067) (0.164) 
Dalit -0.060 -0.219 -0.117  -0.110 -0.349 0.039  -0.045 0.326** -0.035 0.392* -0.017 -0.332 
 (0.566) (0.713) (1.010)  (0.627) (0.827) (1.027)  (0.056) (0.154) (0.070) (0.204) (0.072) (0.220) 
Development regions 
              
Eastern  -0.162 -0.147 -0.150  -0.294 -0.304 -0.050  -0.066 0.623*** -0.063 0.735*** -0.001 -0.201 
 (0.482) (0.579) (1.065)  (0.525) (0.625) (1.122)  (0.053) (0.126) (0.066) (0.152) (0.087) (0.237) 
Central  -0.117 -0.744 0.447  -0.261 -0.926 0.518  -0.086* 0.714*** -0.160*** 0.765*** 0.042 0.048 
 (0.447) (0.577) (0.991)  (0.480) (0.610) (0.994)  (0.044) (0.115) (0.052) (0.150) (0.081) (0.209) 
Western  -1.502*** -1.446** -1.495  -1.721*** -1.629** -1.634*  -0.221*** 0.665*** -0.260*** 0.696*** -0.139* -0.091 
 (0.462) (0.594) (1.026)  (0.496) (0.652) (0.985)  (0.044) (0.121) (0.063) (0.162) (0.079) (0.209) 
Mid-western  -0.887* -1.168** -0.684  -1.080** -1.325** -0.764  -0.131*** 0.494*** -0.158*** 0.353** -0.081 0.185 
 (0.456) (0.565) (0.985)  (0.470) (0.605) (0.963)  (0.043) (0.118) (0.053) (0.154) (0.078) (0.207) 
Constant -22.707*** -24.697*** -18.456***  -25.728*** -27.593*** -22.309***   0.304  0.197  0.790 
 (4.034) (6.119) (5.819)  (4.308) (6.363) (6.564)   (1.083)  (1.633)  (1.385) 
 
              
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241  605 484 364 295 241 189 
Left censored observations 
    121 69 52        
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.38 0.38 0.50  0.09 0.08 0.13  0.42 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.55 
Log likelihood         -1436 -872.7 -550.7   -174.9   -104.9   -59.71   
Note. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of one plus expenditure on education for children to avoid missing values. Primary school age cohort is base group for age cohort. Non-literate or no formal schooling is 
base category for parental education. Ethnic-Tarai and minorities is base category for caste/ethnicity and Far-western is that for development regions. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at residuals within each household. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table 7 
OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Hours Spent on Study at Home during Last Seven Days (Children aged 5-24)  
Variables 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
 Cond. Cond. Cond.  Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (4) (5) (6)  
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
               
Migrant household (M) 2.372*** 1.057 3.478***  1.926*** 0.848 3.008***  0.057* 1.705** 0.024 0.835 0.129*** 1.410 
 (0.753) (1.044) (1.165)  (0.628) (0.869) (0.994)  (0.031) (0.727) (0.040) (0.995) (0.044) (1.157) 
Log of household 
expenditure 4.776*** 6.448*** 1.548  4.297*** 5.765*** 1.792  0.194*** 2.298*** 0.202*** 4.582*** 0.143*** -1.770 
 (0.900) (1.131) (1.538)  (0.723) (1.022) (1.158)  (0.033) (0.850) (0.047) (1.186) (0.044) (1.346) 
Log of household size -2.879*** -5.690*** 0.478  -2.607*** -4.988*** 0.074  -0.141*** -0.849 -0.185*** -3.669*** -0.082 2.951* 
 (1.085) (1.296) (1.922)  (0.766) (1.091) (1.285)  (0.035) (0.893) (0.048) (1.251) (0.054) (1.504) 
Child characteristics               
Secondary school age 
cohort 2.138*** 2.344*** 2.126*  1.473** 1.811** 1.338  -0.048 2.557*** 0.029 2.214** -0.146** 3.917*** 
 (0.702) (0.886) (1.182)  (0.631) (0.829) (0.983)  (0.041) (0.692) (0.055) (0.899) (0.067) (1.087) 
Tertiary school age 
cohort -3.981*** -4.027*** -3.611**  -4.222*** -4.197*** -4.107***  -0.327*** 1.808** -0.286*** 0.724 -0.364*** 3.524*** 
 (0.841) (1.067) (1.413)  (0.685) (0.924) (1.088)  (0.032) (0.836) (0.038) (1.101) (0.055) (1.341) 
Male 1.261** 1.947** 0.087  1.182** 1.669** 0.434  0.046* 0.415 0.051* 1.373* 0.063* -1.309 
 (0.616) (0.774) (0.997)  (0.514) (0.657) (0.831)  (0.024) (0.595) (0.029) (0.752) (0.036) (0.962) 
Birth order -0.482 -1.517 1.664  -0.425 -1.414* 1.563  -0.016 -0.635 -0.044 -1.409 0.071 0.842 
 (0.804) (1.016) (1.344)  (0.649) (0.828) (1.080)  (0.033) (0.756) (0.040) (0.959) (0.050) (1.256) 
Maximum education level 
of parents               
Not completed primary 0.371 -0.798 2.786  0.762 -0.385 3.030*  -0.002 -0.776 -0.050 -1.372 0.067 0.598 
 (1.176) (1.562) (1.870)  (1.040) (1.359) (1.764)  (0.042) (1.269) (0.054) (1.647) (0.062) (2.142) 
Completed primary 2.397** 0.052 5.624***  2.669*** 0.651 5.637***  0.085** 0.513 0.104** -2.078 0.070 5.126*** 
 (1.158) (1.378) (1.899)  (0.920) (1.229) (1.387)  (0.038) (1.117) (0.052) (1.444) (0.052) (1.724) 
Completed lower 
secondary 2.390** -0.109 6.118***  2.459*** 0.154 5.946***  0.079** 0.869 0.042 -1.109 0.132*** 4.041** 
 (1.132) (1.425) (1.811)  (0.905) (1.260) (1.366)  (0.036) (1.089) (0.049) (1.490) (0.047) (1.639) 
Completed secondary 
and above 3.351*** 2.515* 5.586***  3.103*** 2.256** 5.415***  0.087** 1.844* 0.075 1.421 0.136*** 3.665** 
 (1.010) (1.337) (1.778)  (0.805) (1.026) (1.425)  (0.037) (0.977) (0.046) (1.233) (0.051) (1.690) 
Caste/Ethnicity               
Brahmin-Hills  -0.848 -0.566 -0.597  -0.513 -0.542 -0.379  0.031 -1.645 0.034 -0.827 0.009 -1.522 
 (1.312) (1.659) (2.164)  (1.041) (1.424) (1.665)  (0.052) (1.203) (0.066) (1.632) (0.069) (1.914) 
Brahmin-Tarai  -2.843* -2.280 -2.063  -1.789 -1.495 -1.458  0.082 -4.026** 0.049 -2.723  -4.463 
 (1.639) (2.097) (2.598)  (1.536) (1.849) (3.051)  (0.086) (1.697) (0.097) (2.023)  (3.296) 
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Variables 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
 Cond. Cond. Cond.  Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (4) (5) (6)  
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
               
Chhetri -1.633 -0.709 -3.332*  -1.342 -0.762 -2.681*  -0.048 -1.147 -0.054 0.126 -0.064 -2.342 
 (1.207) (1.533) (1.817)  (0.930) (1.317) (1.378)  (0.046) (1.077) (0.061) (1.482) (0.053) (1.635) 
Newar  -3.004* -3.029 -3.571  -2.181 -2.439 -2.454  -0.012 -3.104 -0.042 -2.462 0.008 -4.276 
 (1.757) (2.158) (3.554)  (1.666) (2.234) (2.614)  (0.075) (2.002) (0.115) (2.555) (0.091) (3.324) 
Ethnic -Hills -2.301* -1.393 -4.343**  -1.757 -1.367 -3.282**  -0.034 -2.091 -0.014 0.083 -0.081 
-
4.624*** 
 (1.297) (2.124) (1.830)  (1.101) (1.809) (1.500)  (0.058) (1.276) (0.080) (2.114) (0.066) (1.737) 
Dalit -0.921 0.803 -1.671  -0.725 0.255 -0.697  -0.019 -1.093 -0.008 1.443 0.034 -3.375 
 (1.389) (1.833) (2.325)  (1.203) (1.587) (1.946)  (0.055) (1.413) (0.066) (1.813) (0.073) (2.292) 
Development regions               
Eastern  0.635 0.626 3.223  0.218 0.154 2.918  -0.042 1.687 -0.032 1.459 0.027 4.358* 
 (1.299) (1.617) (2.559)  (1.007) (1.196) (2.141)  (0.052) (1.160) (0.064) (1.356) (0.087) (2.510) 
Central  -3.540*** -4.414*** 0.324  -2.642*** -3.552*** 0.718  -0.056 -3.217*** -0.114** -3.488*** 0.065 0.114 
 (1.019) (1.292) (2.185)  (0.921) (1.172) (1.901)  (0.044) (1.055) (0.049) (1.335) (0.081) (2.208) 
Western  -4.450*** -4.923*** -0.981  -3.689*** -3.895*** -1.132  -0.167*** -2.210** -0.151** -3.385** -0.120 2.433 
 (1.016) (1.268) (2.150)  (0.950) (1.243) (1.881)  (0.045) (1.096) (0.062) (1.398) (0.079) (2.215) 
Mid-western  -0.311 -1.357 2.679  -0.751 -1.627 1.966  -0.105** 1.986* -0.138*** 0.983 -0.044 5.240** 
 (1.125) (1.300) (2.366)  (0.901) (1.163) (1.838)  (0.042) (1.081) (0.048) (1.383) (0.079) (2.177) 
Constant -41.281*** -55.061*** -14.217  -39.938*** -51.471*** -20.157   -12.922  -35.128**  24.694* 
 (9.928) (13.821) (15.912)  (8.246) (12.159) (12.469)   (9.745)  (14.142)  (14.619) 
               
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241  605 489 364 299 241 190 
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.30 0.29  0.05 0.06 0.06   0.14  0.21  0.26 
Log likelihood     -1848 -1114 -715.4  -174.3  -103.0  -59.37  
Note. Primary school age cohort is base group for age cohort. Non-literate or no formal schooling is base category for parental education. Ethnic-Tarai and minorities is base category for caste/ethnicity and Far-
western is that for development regions. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at residuals within each household. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical 
significance respectively. 
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Table 8 
OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Expenditure on Education (Consideration of alternative definition of migrant households, conflict-induced migration and temoral variation in investment in education) 
 Variables 
OLS Model   Tobit Model   Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient 
 All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient 
 All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 Condi. 
Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
 Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
  Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. Mar. Effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
          
A. Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of expenditure on education (Household level) 
Prior-conflict migrant 
household (M16TO20) 
-1.474 -1.371 -1.999  -1.625* -1.432 -2.532   -0.133*** -0.124 -1.604** -0.188 -7.676*** 0.136 
(1.187) (1.555) (1.333)  (0.880) (0.906) (1.989)  (0.046) (0.255) (0.736) (0.324) (2.732) (0.549) 
Inter-conflict migrant 
household (M6TO15) 
0.557 0.231 1.810**  0.597 0.255 1.966***  0.048 0.147 -0.351 0.112 7.133*** 0.223 
(0.366) (0.478) (0.690)  (0.444) (0.562) (0.714)  (0.034) (0.118) (0.680) (0.190) (2.658) (0.166) 
Post-conflict migrant 
household (M0TO5) 
0.692 0.144 1.423*  0.760* 0.156 1.572**  0.033 0.254** -0.794 0.183 2.174** 0.281* 
(0.438) (0.572) (0.814)  (0.459) (0.550) (0.714)  (0.029) (0.125) (0.570) (0.192) (0.944) (0.166) 
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
          
B. Dependent Variable: Budget share (%)  of expenditure on education (Household level) 
Prior-conflict migrant 
household (M16TO20) 
0.348 0.791 -1.930  -0.107 0.395 -2.387  -0.133*** 2.132 -0.116** 2.028 -0.475*** 0.263 
(3.218) (3.992) (2.646)  (1.805) (2.065) (4.138)  (0.046) (2.381) (0.053) (2.808) (0.179) (5.989) 
Inter-conflict migrant 
household (M6TO15) 
1.209 1.280 2.594  1.184 1.150 2.973**  0.048 1.061 -0.025 1.024 0.442*** 1.586 
(1.091) (1.775) (1.905)  (0.903) (1.276) (1.431)  (0.034) (1.101) (0.049) (1.647) (0.170) (1.806) 
Post-conflict migrant 
household (M0TO5) 
2.315** 0.290 4.090**  2.195** 0.361 4.260***  0.033 2.186* -0.057 0.697 0.135*** 3.196* 
(1.135) (1.495) (2.008)  (0.939) (1.258) (1.427)  (0.029) (1.166) (0.041) (1.667) (0.042) (1.808) 
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
          
C. Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of expenditure on education (children age 5-24) 
Prior-conflict migrant 
household (M16TO20) 
0.145 0.148 -1.053  0.176 0.174 -1.075   -0.079** 0.184 -0.054 0.167 -0.117** 0.225 
(0.822) (1.027) (1.807)  (0.770) (0.916) (1.670)  (0.031) (0.193) (0.043) (0.233) (0.050) (0.370) 
Inter-conflict migrant 
household (M6TO15) 
0.948*** 1.136*** 1.142**  1.026*** 1.276** 1.190*  0.089*** 0.056 0.040 -0.025 0.153*** -0.024 
(0.334) (0.421) (0.578)  (0.375) (0.517) (0.624)  (0.030) (0.090) (0.026) (0.125) (0.045) (0.132) 
Post-conflict migrant 
household (M0TO5) 
0.715** 0.166 1.207**  0.812** 0.212 1.426**  0.033* 0.138 0.014 -0.052 0.108*** 0.151 
(0.354) (0.507) (0.570)  (0.389) (0.545) (0.602)  (0.020) (0.096) (0.023) (0.138) (0.030) (0.130) 
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241  605 484 364 295 241 189 
Note. The control variables are similar to Table 4, 5 and 6 for results reported in the Panel A, B and C respectively and are not reported for convenience. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity in 
Panel A and B whereas these are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at residuals within each household in Panel C. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. *, **, 
and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
